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Meaning and Rules 
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Denn eben, wo Begri!fe /eh/en, 
Da stellt eine Regel zur rechten 
Zeit sich ein. 
1. Knowledge of Meaning 
The topic I wish to discuss is 'knowledge' in the sense in 
which this notion occurs in ascriptions of propositional 
knowledge, where these ascriptions are based on linguistic 
utterances made in their natural settings. The relevant 
utterances belong to the assertoric type, i.e. they are 
utterances of declarative sentences issued with assertoric 
force. I shall deal with the following three questions: 
()) What type of theoretical knowledge, if any, does the 
understanding of sentence-meaning consist in? 
(2) How is this understanding of meaning related to the 
complex abilities people display in their use of language, 
in suiting, as it were, the linguistic force to the words 
and the words to the world? 
(3) To what extent, if any, is the connection between 
knowledge of the meaning of a sentence {the proposition 
expressed by it) and the ability to use it illuminated by 
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seeing the latter as due to a form of tacit knowledge of 
rules governing the application of the component words 
of the sentence in question? 
By 'tacit knowledge' I mean a type of knowledge which, 
even though it can somehow be manifested, need not, and 
in many cases cannot be articulated linguistically (as is 
the case with many practical abilities of a non-linguistic 
type). This qualification is intended to rule out the notion 
of 'cognising' a system of rules (a grammar), where cog-
nising is conceived as an inaccessible mental process or 
state - an idea which has been in vogue with grammarians 
of the generative-transformational school. 1 With respect 
to the grammarians' alleged rules (in contrast to the rules 
tacit knowledge of which can in our sense become manifest) 
the notion of tacit guidance is too weak to play the 
desired explanatory role. 2 However, if the idea of being 
guided by a rule can be elucidated by a theory which en-
ables us to understand or invites us to improve a practice 
of ours, then there is no reason to resist the explanation 
offered by that theory. The account of our inferential 
practice given by a Gentzen-style explanation of the 
meanings of the logical constants seems to be a case in 
point. 3 
Few philosophers would nowadays claim that in giv-
ing an account of our practice of speaking a language any 
appeal to cognitive notions, such as 'grasping the meaning', 
'seeing the point', •accepting as correct', 'realising the 
bearing of', 'responding appropriately to', etc., can be 
dispensed with. Many, however, would maintain that these 
notions become relevant only at the pragmatic level or at 
the level of performance, where we are faced with the 
problem of accounting for the use of language and the 
quirks and twists encountered in the utterances of indi-
vidual speakers. But these elements remain, so to speak, 
inert, for the relevant questions about meaning can be 
answered e.g. by employing the notions of truth, satis-
faction, primitive denotation, or, perhaps, by means of a 
soberly modalised version of these notions. As one of the 
main points of using language is to convey relevant infor-
mation to an audience by means of sentences held or be-
lieved to be true and perspicuously formulated, it is 
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supposed to follow that the employment of cognitive 
notions will be confined to the spelling out of conversational 
implicatures, presuppositions, implications, and whatever 
else attaches to a sentence, not in virtue of the meaning 
of its component words and the way they are put together, 
but in virtue of our uttering it e.g. in a certain context 
with a certain audience-directed intention and in accordance 
with a rough estimate of the audience's epistemic expec-
tations. 
It will then be the main task of an approach which sees 
cognitive notions as merely secondary to offer an 
explanation of what 'relevant information\ 'sentence held 
true', •perspicuous formulation'. etc. mean, by appealing 
to nothing but the results yielded by a theory of truth-
conditions. A programme of this type has been advocated 
and defended by Donald Davidson. It is not as if David-
son believed that the above-mentioned cognitive notions 
were irrelevant. As a matter of fact, in his theory they 
play the role of unanalysed primitives, used but not men-
tioned. Thus even in Davidson's austere framework it will 
still make sense to say that understanding a language is 
related to theoretical knowledge, though not with know-
ledge of what individual sentences mean but (for reasons 
connected with Davidson's holism) with knowledge of entire 
theories. 
Before proceeding to discuss the questions raised at the 
beginning of this paper, I want to mention a very general 
and radical objection that might be levelled against 
the view to be defended here, that knowledge of meaning 
has a lot to do with knowledge proper. The objector will 
emphasise first of all that any appeal to the notion of 
knowledge proper - no matter whether this is construed as 
justified true belief or as evident judgment or as true belief 
produced by an appropriate causal chain - contains an 
implicit reference to the notion of truth. This reference 
emerges, he will argue, in two natural assumptions regard-
ing certain ways of manifesting knowledge: (a) that an ex-
plicit knowledge-claim carries with it a truth-claim, and 
(b) that that in which our alleged knowledge consists in-
volves knowing a way of verifying, justifying, supporting 
the claim that the proposition in question is true. and hence 
being able to back the correctness of the assertion made 
92 
Meaning and Rules 
by means of a sentence intended to express that pro-
position. Thus applying the notion of knowledge proper to 
meaning will, if successful, not only assimilate under~t~nd-
ing the meaning of a sentence to knowing the p~opos1tion 
it expresses; it will also establish a close connectlon between 
meaning, truth, and ways of attaining and ~a.nir:esting 
knowledge. Now, however, our objector will ms1st that 
such an account of meaning will be badly incomplete. For 
it will, according to our objector, disregard the dependence 
of our understanding meaning on our ability to use lan-
guage to produce effects of non-cognitive types, and he 
will make much of the perlocutionary element in our use 
of language (as for example when we produce by linguistic 
means fright, amusement, or even certain quasi-hypnotic 
states in an audience). Further, he will stress that in this 
perlocutionary use of language the sharing of information, 
and hence the notion of truth, will play no role. 
A related line of attack upon the connection between 
meaning and knowledge suggested above is the following. 
We often speak, for example, of understanding a poem, 
or a piece of music, or a work of art; and yet it is hard 
to see what sort of theoretical (much less propositional) 
knowledge could be said to be involved in this kind of 
understanding. Moreover, the type of situation here al-
luded to is one where it is difficult to see whether the 
requirement of 1manifestability' of understanding is ful-
filled. 4 The trouble is that there seem to be no generally 
applicable criteria for crediting people with an understand-
ing, or lack of understanding, of a work of art. Thus the 
notion of understanding here appears to be very remote 
from what is generally meant by 'knowledge' in the strict 
sense. 
To this objection, however, we may reply by pointing 
out that the problem here is not so much one of criteria 
of •manifestation', but rather a problem concerning the 
peculiar notion of understanding alluded to in the case in 
point. In the case of ordinary uses of language the ques-
tion of what 1understandint consists in can be quite per-
spicuously and clearly reformulated as a question about 
what to count as a manifestation of such understanding. 
And here we have plenty of criteria: we can give explana-
tions of meaning, synonyms, antonyms, paraphrases, trans-
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lations into different languages, we can produce examples 
of applications of the word in question, point out links 
between sentences containing that word and sentences 
that can be •inferred' from them (in a loose sense of 
inferring including, for instance, lexical inferences). 
Thus understanding is not a matter of all or nothing; it 
typically comes in degrees, and this may lead to certain 
types of puzzle, but it does not mean that a wedge can be 
driven between the notions of understanding and of know-
ing the meaning of an expression, nor that no criteria can 
be specified where we are dealing with a manifest case of 
understanding an expi'ession. 
As regards the more general objection, it will surely not 
do to deny the existence of the perlocutionary uses 
of language mentioned; I do not wish to suggest that all 
understanding of meaning can be reduced to the true-
false dimension, nor that propositional knowledge can be 
reduced to the dimension of verifiability-falsifiability. 
Speaking a language requires a number of complex skills, 
and to be sure some of these skills are designed to serve 
ends very remote from the Augustinian characterisation of 
the point of language as 'ut doceamus et commemoremus'. 
Still, as to explanations of meaning and understanding 
meaning, it seems preferable to start from uses of lan-
guage which are basic in an obvious way - ostensive de-
finitions, statements of recognition and re-identification -
and these uses do have a dimension of truth and false-
hood. Moreover, it seems difficult to see how perlocu-
tionary effects can be caused independently of what is 
generally regarded as the meaning of the relevant expres-
sions. Finally, there is no way of giving a general and 
systematic survey of perlocutionary effects, and thus we 
cannot hope to arrive at a tenable characterisation of 
meaning (and of understanding meaning) by starting from 
perlocutionary uses alone. 
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2. Meaning, Belief and Interpretation 
In Davidson's, as in Quine's, account, knowledge of a 
language is compared to knowledge of a scientific theory. 
Let us follow their lead and consider the corpus of sen-
tences of a language held true at a certain time; 5 there is 
nothing amiss in regarding this body of sentences as ar-
ticulating a picture of the world which is largely correct 
(on the plausible assumption that, as Davidson puts it, 
'much of what is agreed must be true if some of what is 
agreed is false'). 6 A rather indirect construal of this body 
of knowledge is offered by Davidson's theory of radical 
interpretation. 7 This theory does not even purport to 
explain what it is that speakers actually know or under-
stand and what it is that enables them to assent to or 
dissent from given utterances, but only what information 
needs to be imparted to a potential interpreter so that he 
will be able to speak the language. In the framework of 
such a theory assent and dissent are supposed to suffice as 
behavioural data to allow the radical interpreter to start off 
on his enterprise; for he is not interested in questions 
concerning that substantial knowledge which the linguistic 
performances of the natives can be seen as manifestations 
of. By contrast, a theory dealing with the question of how 
understanding manifests itself in the use of language will 
choose as its data linguistic acts more specific than assent 
and dissent; among these, assertions in the strong sense will 
play an important role, since they are linguistic acts which 
speakers usually volunteer and regarding which questions as 
to grounds and justifications have real substance, whereas 
mere assenting does not normally commit a speaker to 
such an extent that he would be expected to feel obliged 
to answer that kind of question. 
There is of course a sharp contrast between holding a 
sentence true and its being true, and this contrast is 
indeed emphasised by Davidson. Yet sentence-meaning 
and belief must be related, for my holding a given sentence 
true depends on my grasp of its meaning on the one hand 
and my judgment as to its semantic value on the other. 
• A speaker who holds a sentence to be true on an occasion 
does so in part because of what he means, or would mean, 
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by an utterance of that sentence, and in part because of 
what he believes'. 8 The contrast between sentence-mean-
ing and belief is implicitly appealed to when we are ex-
plaining to a speaker the source of a mistake of his by 
pointing out that he has an imperfect grasp of what the 
words used mean or an incorrect understanding of how 
things are. We say that he either misunderstands the mean-
ing of an expression or falsely believes that things stand 
in the way suggested by his sentence. This use of the 
concept of belief - that is, when it is employed to 'take 
up the slack between objective truth and the held true' 
-
9 is, according to Davidson, at the basis of all our 
attempts at trying to interpret the speech of our fellow 
human beings. If in a community language were used in 
such a way that it would not be possible to tell which of 
two speakers who disagree on the truth value of a given 
sentence was right for the reason that in their community 
it was admissible to understand words in different and 
somehow unaccountable ways, we should find it difficult 
to make any sense of what they were doing in their use 
of language. Indeed we should be reluctant to describe it 
as being in any sense an activity, as something that was 
carried out with a view to the satisfaction of certain 
desires on the basis of certain beliefs. 
It would, however, be rash to conclude that smoothness 
of communication is of itself a guarantee that whenever 
people agree with each other - no matter whether this 
agreement manifests itself in explicit assent or tacit 
acceptance - we shall be able to sort out the following· 
two components, viz. what the sentence means to them 
because of the other things they know and believe, and 
the objective meaning of the sentence, i.e. what it says 
independently of its being a possible object of belief or 
knowledge for them. That conclusion would be particularly 
rash, if we thought - as Davidson no doubt does - that 
some version of Quine's indeterminacy thesis needed to be 
taken into account. 1 0 Quinets claim, in this context, is 
that as soon as we abandon the safe region of stimulus 
meaning and observation sentences, it becomes increas-
ingly difficult to sort out meaning from belief and an 
increasingly tricky problem to tell whether agreement and 
disagreement are due to our ways of understanding and 
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misunderstanding the meaning of our sentences or to our 
sentences' being such that their meaning is objectively 
underdetermined by the empirical data. In fact, Quine 
explicitly rejects the idea of a sharp line between meaning 
and belief; according to him, meaning is what can be 
gleaned from an intersection of idiolects. Davidson, on the 
other hand, thinks that such a line can be drawn, though 
not in a unique way. Moreover, it is a consequence of his 
holistic standpoint that it does not make sense to ask 
which piece of knowledge or which belief a specific utter-
ance purports to convey. Radical interpretation, like a 
scientific theory, is subject to holistic constraints, and 
the relevant •optimum fit' is between the totality of T-
sentences 1 1 and the available evidence concerning sen-
tences held true by the native speakers in question. 1 2 
Here, however, we shall need more and finer distinc-
tions than that between meaning and belief. What must 
sharply be distinguished are the following: 
the content of a sentence (e.g. that John met Bill in 
Chicago last week), 
the ways of establishing it, 
the inf or mat ion that it conveys to different speakers 
on the basis of what they know already and are will-
ing to believe. 
Information is not, in my opinion, part of meaning proper. 
As regards the notion of content, it is natural to wonder 
whether the content of a sentence given in terms of truth-
conditions exhausts all that we may want to say about 
knowledge of meaning. 1 3 For even if a sharp distinction 
is made between the content of a sentence and the ways 
of establishing it as correct, we may still argue that, in 
order to account for the ability to use a sentence appro-
priately, essential appeal has to be made to knowledge of 
how to establish its truth or of what counts as a way of 
establishing it as true. Moreover, the question will arise 
whether, among the ways of establishing a sentence as 
true, some may perhaps count as more primitive, more 
fundamental than others. 1 4 (Knowing certain ways of 
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establishing a sentence as true may, of course, involve 
information available in the community as a whole but 
not to each and every speaker of the language of the 
community. Nevertheless, we shall want to make a distinc-
tion between knowing the meaning of a sentence like •The 
water is boiling' and knowing all or some of the scientific 
information possibly relevant to such a sentence.) 
Now, a theory constructed along Quinean or Davidson-
ian lines will offer an account of the 'interanimation of 
sentences' 1 5 and of the mechanism whereby further pieces 
of knowledge can be gathered from knowledge of the con-
tent of a sentence (as given by its truth-conditions). For 
example, from 'Bill met John at the conference in Chi-
cago' I can infer that there is someone whom Bill met, 
that this event took place in the past, etc. Moreover, I 
may fit the (possibly new) information conveyed by that 
sentence into my system of beliefs and make guesses such 
as: •so Bill preferred the Chicago conference to the Lon-
don conference, and hence did not meet Jack, etc.' Plainly 
such guesses cannot be accounted for by a theory of rad-
ical interpretation; they are what Ramsey calls beliefs 'of 
the primary sort', and such beliefs constitute •a map of 
neighbouring space by which we steer. It remains such a 
map however much we complicate it or fill in details. But 
if we professedly extend it to infinity, it is no longer a 
map; we cannot take it in or steer by it. Our journey is 
over before we need its remoter parts.' 1 s Thus, even if a 
speaker's beliefs and the speaker's meanings of the sen-
tences he uses are systematically related to objective 
sentence-meanings, they do not belong to the latter. 
Obviously knowledge of objective meaning also involves 
awareness of entailments such as •If Bill met John, then 
John met Bill', which can be accounted for in terms of 
lexical inference, i.e. by referring to our knowledge of the 
fact that 'meet' (unlike •see') expresses a symmetric 
relation. 
However, there seems to be a reference to the tacit 
exercise of skills such as the inferential abilities exempli-
fied by inductive, deductive, and lexical reasoning also in 
Davidson's account of that type of theoretical knowledge 
which is implicit in knowledge of the meaning of a sen-
tence. 1 7 For in order to articulate the theoretical know-
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ledge which is implicit in knowing the meaning of a sen-
tence, we cannot help appealing to a form of tacit know-
ledge of how to unravel the relevant entailments. For such 
unravelling to be possible we must, moreover, assume that 
meaning is somehow •stable', that words do not change 
their use: the use of a word must be in harmony with its 
meaning, it must as it were be •responsible' to its 
meaning. (More on the notion of harmony in section 4. 
below.) 
3. Recognitional Capacities 
Wittgenstein, in his Notebooks, wonders whether we 
should try to •find an expression ... for HOW MUCH a 
proposition says' (p. 54). But even independently of the 
somewhat austere framework of the early Wittgenstein one 
may speculate about this idea, and then it becomes clear 
that a measure of how much a sentence says would also 
be a measure of how much one is expected to understand 
in order to be credited with full mastery of its sense. 
Here 'full mastery' means being able to use it correctly 
and/or recognise it as true under appropriate circumstances 
(no matter whether on a given occasion we. by accident, 
make mistakes in this regard). The •appropriate circum-
stances' are those that we have been taught to regard as 
appropriate and are commonly regarded as appropriate, 
or at least relevant, to establishing the correctness of the 
claim in question; and this may involve sensory experi-
ence, methods of verification, calculation, measurement, 
and, in general, the exercise of certain recognitional 
abilities of varying degrees of sophistication. 
In the context of propositional knowledge the word 
•recognition' can be taken either in a strong or in a weak 
sense. In the weak sense it signifies acceptance or acknow-
ledgement of the truth of a proposition as something a 
speaker may express on the basis of mere hearsay, or of 
the testimony of some expert. In the strong sense it means 
that one has exercised one's own recognitional abilities 
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(perceptual faculties, acquired techniques of measuring or 
calculating, etc.) in order to find out whether the circum-
stances verifying the assertion in question are given. 
That there is a genuine difference between two types 
of linguistic act corresponding to these two ways of under-
standing •recognition' can be seen when one notices that 
the act corresponding to the weak sense of •recognition' 
can be called an act of assertion only in an attenuated 
sense: it shades off into what may be regarded as the sep-
arate act of assenting. Paradigmatic cases of assenting and 
asserting are quite obviously connected with different 
degrees of knowledge on the part of the speaker, but it is 
very difficult to spell out what amount of knowledge is 
necessary to tum an affirmative utterance - an expression 
of assent - into an assertion proper and what lack of 
knowledge would disqualify an utterance from counting as 
a genuine assertion. 
The difference at issue here may become clearer by 
considering the familiar - and frequently frustrating -
experience of reading e.g. a comment in the financial 
pages of a newspaper or a musicologist's account of a 
piece of music we have listened to. It may be that in-
wardly we assent to what we read, but when it comes to 
expressing our assent we may well wonder what basis 
there is for our doing so. Not only are we at a loss to 
describe a possible method of verification of the state-
ment in question - we should probably not be able to 
recognise a verifying circumstance even if confronted with 
it. But worse is yet to come. Once we have started wonder-
ing what right we have to assent to, or even assert, 
statements based on knowledge we do not possess, we may 
then go on to ask ourselves whether we have fully under-
stood their meaning. Now, a lot has been said about the 
problems involved in this type of situation, which clearly 
reflects the •linguistic division of labour'. 1 8 We should 
not, however, regard such cases as normal, for in most 
everyday situations expert knowledge of the more esoteric 
kind plays no significant role, and the relevant knowledge 
of most speakers can for our purposes be regarded as 
equal. It is plausible to suggest that an account of our 
understanding a language contain a substantive reference 
to speakers' recognitional capacities. which chiefly consist 
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in means and methods of verifying statements containing 
expressions of whose meaning we have an implicit grasp. 
•True' and •false' are words that are used to elucidate 
what we mean by 'proposition'. As Wittgenstein has pointed 
out in the Investigations (cf. I. 136), they belong to the 
kind of things we tend to say about propositions but must 
not be regarded as defining their essence. It is not as if, 
within a given set of sentences, one could simply discriminate 
those suited for statement-making and then go on to 
inquire under which conditions they would turn out to be 
justifiably assertible in virtue of their meanings and our 
recognitional capacities on the one hand and of how 
things are on the other. We start, instead, from the 
observation that people engage in the activities of assert-
ing, refusing to assert, assenting, dissenting, asking ques-
tions. giving grounds, expressing opinions on the strength 
and appropriateness of these grounds. stating deductive 
arguments, etc., and armed with these data we then ask 
ourselves whether there is a notion or a set of kindred 
notions broad enough for being used to redescribe their 
linguistic performance in reason-giving terms and to form 
a conception of the content and significance of what they 
say. 
It is natural to regard the acts of assenting, dissenting, 
etc. as expressions of understanding and, in the case of 
the linguistic act of assertion, as expressions of knowledge. 
The naturalness of this assumption resides in this: that 
understanding manifests itself in the ability to form cor-
rect judgments under appropriate circumstances and in the 
capacity to utter some of these judgments in the form of 
assertions in contexts which are thought to be theoret-
ically relevant or practically useful or conversationally 
appropriate. It is therefore natural to think that a signi-
ficant insight in the content of these utterances can be 
gained if, instead of asking 'Which are the (possibly re-
cognition-transcendent) truth-conditions of sentences used 
to make assertions?', we ask questions such as •what 
beliefs (or knowledge) do these assertions purport to 
articulate?' •How is it generally possible to attain the 
beliefs (or types of knowledge) manifested on this par-
ticular occasion by this particular speaker?'. •which 
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features of our behaviour can be seen as connected with 
our having certain beliefs?' 
4. The Harmony between Meaning and Rules 
It is no doubt possible to understand the meaning of a 
sentence without knowing its truth value; it suffices to 
know which possibilities it rules out and which possibilities 
it allows. Yet once we know a route that leads to estab-
lishing its truth value (no matter whether we ourselves 
are capable of following that route), we command a better 
grasp of the meanings of its component words, and it is 
in virtue of this fuller understanding that we may be able 
to form a judgment. But is it legitimate to explain the 
ability we display when, say, making a correct perceptual 
judgment, performing a calculation, seeing certain features 
instantiated in a given pattern, etc., as issuing, at least in 
part, from a fuller grasp of the meanings of the words 
we use, as if these meanings enshrined the possibilities of 
application? 
Frege suggests that this notion of 'enshrining• or 'con-
taining' can be understood in terms of the metaphor of 
plant and seed (Frege 1884, sec. 88; I 903, sec. 14 7). In the 
second volume of the Grundgesetze he writes that we 
'hope to be able to develop the whole wealth of objects 
and functions treated of in mathematics out of the germ 
{Keim] of ... eight functions'. 1 9 And in Grundlagen he 
says apropos of his notion of analyticity that the conclu-
sions which, in arithmetic, extend our knowledge 'are 
contained in the definitions, but as plants are contained 
in their seeds, not as beams are contained in a house'. 2 0 
The justification of this claim requires both the construc-
tion of a formal system and a viable explanation of what 
it is for a (simple or complex) sign to have a Bedeutung 
and of that which gives 'life' to a sign, 2 1 viz. its sense. 
The first task was fulfilled in Begrif/sschrift and completed 
in the Grundgesetze. 
Of course, if the interest of Frege's considerations 
were confined to the philosophy of mathematics or a 
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theory of deductive inference, they would be of little 
relevance in the present context. But, as a matter of fact, 
they contain a profound and elaborate theory of meaning, 
and thus contribute to fulfilling the second task mentioned 
in the previous paragraph. This theory became the object 
of Wittgenstein's sustained criticism and thus the starting-
point from which he began to develop his own conceptions 
of meaning. The point at issue is the above-mentioned 
notion of 'harmony' (cf. end of section 2. above); this 
notion is much wider than that of analyticity and is in-
tended to apply to the whole of language. The question is, 
roughly speaking, whether it is legitimate to say that the 
uses we make of a given word in all kinds of context 
have to be in accordance with the main f ea tu res of its 
meaning as exemplified in a privileged type of context. 
Further questions concern the desirability and reality of 
this kind of harmony. 
In his vitriolic attack on Hermann Schubert's account 
of the extension of the number-system Frege outlines sev-
eral of the themes later discussed in the Grundgesetze 22 
and gives a compendious statement of his views on the connec-
tions between sense, rules, and Bedeutung (reference): 
So the string of signs is supposed to be assigned a 
sense, and it is supposed to follow from this sense that 
the string may be manipulated according to certain 
rules. This is clear enough: the rules according to 
which the string is to be manipulated depend on the 
sense of the signs. Nothing could be simpler. except 
that it is diametrically opposed to a certain formalist 
doctrine according to which signs have no sense, or 
at least need not have a sense, but are to be 
conceived as similar to chess figures, where the rules 
of manipulation can be established quite arbitrarily 
and irrespective of a sense ... The domain of 
objects is itself governed by certain laws, and it is 
clear enough how these laws are mirrored in the 
form of rules regulating the use of the corresponding 
signs. 2 3 
Technically the 'mirroring• alluded to in this quotation is 
achieved by laying down the semantic interpretation of the 
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above-mentioned eight functions which contain all further 
developments - as in a seed. 2 4 
Sentences have sense; they express thoughts; their truth 
depends both on the meaning of the individual words 
occurring in them and on that which makes them true in 
reality. When using a word for making new statements we 
must not disrupt the extant fund of sentences held true in 
which that word occurs. In the case of a formal system 
the rules and definitions which we may introduce must be 
in harmony with the original sense conferred upon our 
words by the statements already accepted as true (e.g. 
axioms). The rules which govern the employment of num-
ber-words must be in agreement with their sense, say, as 
Anzahlen (cardinal numbers) or Masszahlen (measures) 
respectively: for sense is our only way of articulating our 
knowledge of the laws that reign in the realm of numbers. 
This conception leads to the well-known point that 
there has to be harmony between rules which govern the 
handling of connectives in derivations and the meaning of 
connectives as given, say, by their truth-functional ex-
planation. The idea is familiar: it was illustrated by Prior 
(1960) and commented on by Belnap (1962). Suppose we 
wished to introduce the propositional connective 'tonk' by 
laying down the following rules governing its introduction 
and elimination: 
A B 
tonk I 
A tonk B A tonk B 
A tonk B A tonk B 
tonk E 
A B 
Then we can prove by means of a simple derivation that 
any two propositions are logically equivalent. 2 5 The moral 
drawn by Prior is that not any rule would do: rules have 
to be in harmony with our semantic intuitions, e.g. as laid 
down by means of truth tables. Belnap remarks that the 
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new connective does not yield a •conservative extension' 
of our previous calculus, where an extension counts as 
conservative if it does not generate new theorems con-
taining only the "old' constants. Using Dummett's (1973a) 
terminology we may say that there is no harmony between 
the grounds for asserting • A tonk B' and the consequences 
we draw from it. 
There is another, interestingly similar case, mentioned 
by Belnap, viz. 'Peano's operation' ? , which is defined in 
the following way: 
a C a+c 
? =df. 
b d b+d 
Here we can say that this rule would immediately allow 
us to prove a contradiction or, to take a more general 
example from Kleene, that the function (p. q) 0 (r, s) "" 
(p + r, q + s) 'is a perfectly well defined operation 
(function) on fractions which does not induce an opera-
tion on rationals'. 2 6 The moral is that (not even) in logic 
can we make up the rules as we go along, whether or not 
Frege's suggestive picture of the harmony between rules 
and the senses of expressions whose use is governed by 
these rules is accepted. Perhaps in order to bring out this 
type of harmony Frege, in his essay "Compound Thoughts" 
("Gedankengefilge"), supplements his account of truth-
functionally defined connectives with a hint as to their 
inferential role. But as Frege does not see the point of 
proving uniqueness (i.e. that rules characterise exactly one 
connective), his remarks have only heuristic significance. 
Wittgenstein's attack on the conception outlined above 
is essentially an attack on the assumption that there is 
'harmony' between meanings and rules. Take for instance 
the following passage on negation from the Investigations: 
There cannot be a question whether these or other 
rules are the correct ones for use of 'not'. (I mean, 
whether they accord with its meaning.) For without 
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these rules the word has as yet no meaning: and if 
we change _the rules, it now has another meaning (or 
none), and m that case we may just as well change the 
word too. 2 7 
Wittgenstein's attitude towards the problems surrounding 
the concept •rute' is ambivalent. In the passage quoted 
above he seems to argue in favour of the theory Frege so 
ve_hemen.tly opposed in Grundgesetze, viz. the theory of 
arithmetic as a game of chess. On the other hand we 
know that h~ disagreed with Hilbert's formalist philosophy 
of mathematics, which according to Wittgenstein's view 
red~ced mathematical reasoning to formal manipulations. 
Kreisel 2 8 calls Wittgenstein's philosophy a 'philosophy of 
rules and proofs'; it seems to me however that on closer 
. . ' ' 
~crutmy W~ttgenstein's arguments against meaning-platon-
1sm apply Just as well to rule-platonism. 2 9 Besides, we 
should be wary of saying that understanding meaning is a 
matte.r of rule-following. There are, to be sure, certain 
pract1ce_s whose essence consists in following rules (e.g. 
calcul~t10ns, drawing diagrams according to explicit in-
structions, etc.) but these are practices of limited scope: 
only of cases where a rule is actually 'involved' in a 
calculation can we realty say that they are cases of rule-
following; 3 0 a rule 'does not act at a distance'. 3 1 As I do 
not se: any direct connection between meaning and rule-
followmg m the sense specified above, I think that to 
talk of •rules of meaning• is to stretch that notion in an 
illegitimate way. 3 2 
Wittgenstein criticises the idea that meaning guides 
us along invisible rails and tells us which extensions of 
meaning are compatible with our initial stipulations or 
pre-existing practices and which are not 3 3 he criticises 
the view that use, or application, flows from meaning, or 
from some canonical example of its application. Meaning is 
that· whi~h -:ve se~m to understand 'mit einem Schlag'; use 
exten.ds m time; 1f meaning = use, are not these two im-
ages m conflict? Our earlier steps do not determine our 
later steps, at best they influence them. At each step we 
need a new decision, but as there are no obvious grounds 
determining which decision is to be taken it follows that 
what we do is arbitrarily giving or withhdlding assent to 
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a new application of the word. Is this really the pictur~ 
that Wittgenstein is suggesting that we embrace? And, if 
so which consequences are we to draw as far as •know-
• ledge of meaning' is concerned? 
Wittgenstein's criticism of the conception described 
above has several facets. It may be read as the claim that 
we have a wrong theory of our practice: we credit our-
selves with knowledge we do not possess and/or miscon-
strue the knowledge which we do possess. However, Witt-
genstein is often interpreted as suggesting the view that 
we possess no peculiarly linguistic knowledge that_ enables 
us to take part in the speaking of language. Speaking a 
language is so interwoven with other practices, forms of 
life, techniques that it is hopeless to disentangle what 
belongs to knowledge of meaning fro?1 what belong_s to 
something else. Thus, according to this way of reading 
Wittgenstein, there could be drawn no distinction between 
the content of a sentence. the information it conveys to 
different speakers, and ways of establishing is as true. I 
think that this sort of interpretation of Wittgenstein is to 
be rejected. 
Wittgenstein insists that all ascriptions of knowledge of 
meaning have to be anchored in external criteria (Investig-
ations, I, 269, 305-9). That is, we are bound to form a 
wrong conception of the meanings of our words if, say, 
in explaining our use of the word •remember' we appeal 
to an 'inner process' for which the word is supposed to 
stand (305). In section 2, above, we interpreted this 
requirement as having the consequence that a manifesta-
tion of such understanding consists in the ability to form 
correct judgments under appropriate circumstances and in 
the capacity to utter some of these judgments in t~e form 
of assertions in contexts which are thought to be either 
theoretically relevant or practically useful or conversation-
ally appropriate. When giving an improved account of how 
understanding manifests itself in behaviour we shall very 
probably appeal to the relevant recognitional abilities. The 
dictum •1 recognise a proof when confronted with one• can 
be applied outside the province of mathematics. We often 
use similar locutions in other contexts. We say that we 
can recognise a face, a smile, a way of walking when we 
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see it. We have practical abilities which cannot be arti-
culated linguistically. 
In trying to give an explanation of meaning we may 
find ourselves in a position similar to that in which we 
want to express how to exercise a practical skill. The dif-
ficult:ies involved in this are hinted at by Wittgenstein 
when he writes, 'When we want to describe the use of a 
word, - isn't it like wanting to make a portrait of a 
face? I see it clearly; the expression of these features is 
well known to me; and if I had to paint it I shouldn't 
know where to begin'. 34 
Wittgenstein usually appeals to recognitional capacities 
in contexts where he asks questions such as whether or 
not a new specimen falls within a given familiar pattern. 
Now, in order to throw light on the notion of harmony 
and its possible connection with our recognitional capa-
cities, I shall mention a few examples that could be seen 
as calling in question some of our previous claims. Some 
of these examples actually occur in Wittgenstein while 
some are my own invention. I shall then elaborate on a 
very simple example. 
Does the word 'planet' as it occurs in Kepler's law 
of planetary motion (before 1630) acquire a new mean-
ing in 1791 (discovery of Uranus), in 1846 (discovery 
of Neptune), in 1930 (discovery of Pluto)? 
Answer: No. For the law is to be taken 'in intension'; 
unlike contingent generalisations, it licenses subjunctive 
conditionals such as 'If a tenth planet were discovered, it 
would obey Kepler's Law•. Frege would say: It does not 
speak of heavenly bodies but of concepts; we may under-
stand the proposition expressed without knowing the name 
of a single planet. 
Does the expression 'polygon constructible with ruler 
and compasses' acquire a different meaning in 1801 
when Gauss comes up with the formula which tells us 
which the regular polygons .are? 
Answer: the meaning does not change; yet the relevant 
procedures and techniques are, surely, different, and the 
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problem, once solved, becomes uninteresting. Thus the 
answer is a qualified No. 
Does the number-word 'five' have a different mean-
ing for the tribe which counts • 1, 2, 3, 4, 5' from the 
meaning it has for us? 
Answer: Yes, our 'arithmetics' would obviously be differ-
ent, and it would show in our practices as welt: that set 
of numbers is not closed under addition. 3 5 
Does the number 2 when used as an Anzahl ('2 
chairs') have a different meaning from the number 2 
when used as a Masszahl ("2 metres long')? 
Both Frege and Wittgenstein answer Yes. Many would say 
that they can be shown to be 'equivalent' in a technical 
sense of the term. 3 6 
In which sense can our techniques of measuring (e.g. 
weighing) be said to differ from those of a tribe 
where wood is sold by the lengths of the piles, leaving 
their heights out of account? Are they the same up to a 
point and then start to differ? 3 7 
I should say that the techniques were different from the 
start, but it requires some argument to show that this is 
the case. 3 8 
Do the meanings of &, v, --+, etc., change when we add 
the quantifiers, thereby extending our calculus? 
The answer is No: the quantifiers conservatively extend 
the calculus. 
Now, let us consider a simple case. Doubts might arise 
about whether a certain piece of furniture can still be 
called a chair. Neither an alleged mental 'template' of a 
chair nor a functional characterisation of a piece of fur-
niture of this sort will here be of any avail. It will be 
better to see our judgment as the outcome of a different 
way of looking at things, viz. of our attempt at fitting 
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the object in question into a pattern of continuous grada-
tions. It will be more adequate to reformulate our judg-
ment, for example in the following way: •well, given that 
this is called a chair, and that too, we may also call that 
object over there a chair.' What gives my judgment its 
point is, so to speak, an underlying structure of compar-
atives. Perhaps a comparison with colour words is appro-
priate here: although we may be in doubt as to the cri-
teria for, say, 'pink' and hesitate to apply the word to a 
given specimen, we may on various occasions formulate 
such conditionals as •If you call this pink, you have to 
call this other specimen pink too'. That such conditionals 
may have a well-determined sense, even though the colour 
words themselves are vague, shows that what gives these 
conditionals a point is the underlying structure of com-
paratives and its appropriateness to (some) cases of colour 
words. Similar considerations may suggest a clue to the 
understanding of vagueness and the structure of overt 
comparatives and superlatives. 
Many of Wittgenstein's remarks that belong in this 
context are meant to show that our actual decisions about 
whether or not to apply a certain word are not to be 
seen as issuing from the recognition of necessary and 
sufficient conditions which a certain type of object is 
supposed to satisfy, 3 9 but from our capacity to fit things 
into patterns, which involves our ability to be struck by 
certain similarities while not responding to others. It may 
happen that only in a given context do certain aspects or 
patterns become salient, while in other contexts they re-
main absent. This is exemplified by many of the experi-
ments described by Gestalt psychologists and referred to 
by Wittgenstein in his later work. The examples mentioned 
above, on the other hand, lack this feature: to be sure, 
we can gain important structural insight by, say, construct-
ing the real numbers out of the natural ones (or the other 
way around) or by comparing the expressive powers of dif-
ferent languages. But I do not think that this situation is 
similar to that in which, say, one half of a grey ring 
appears lighter on being seen against a black background 
than the other half, which is seen against a white back-
ground. And it is because of this dissimilarity that many 
mathematical or logical examples given by Wittgenstein in 
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order to engender doubts about sameness of meaning and 
to make us aware of the tension between the meaning of 
a word and its rule-governed application seem to fall wide 
of the mark. This is not to deny that these examples can 
be of heuristic significance, at least in the sense of 
reminding us of how little we know about our recognitional 
abilities. 
But what have these recognitional abilities got to do 
with knowledge of meaning? Could we not just say: These 
are brute facts of our natural history ('the frog's eyes 
differ from man's eyes, etc.')? Is it a fact of our natural 
history that our vocabulary for describing smells is so 
poor (Investigations, I, 610)? I do not know. However, 
before yielding to this 'naturalistic' temptation and hand-
ing over our philosophical problems to psychologists, bio-
logists, etc., we'd better have a closer look at the matter. 
And a first step, I have argued, is to try to express our . 
question more precisely: How does the mention of recogni-
tional capacities enter into an explanation of our knowledge 
of meaning? In sum, it is not as if (e.g. in applying a 
given concept to new instances) we were free at every 
step: it is simply that our 'bondage' is not that imposed 
on us by a rule, or a decision-procedure, or a picture, but 
the far more insidious one imposed on us by the practice 
of exercising our recognitional abilities. 4 0 
Notes 
1. Cf. Chomsky 1976, pp. 164f.: 'Let us say that if a 
speaker knows the language L then he cognizes L. Fur-
thermore, he cognizes the linguistic facts that he knov:-s 
(in any uncontroversial sense of "know") and he cognizes 
the principles and rules of his internalized grammar, both 
those that might be brought to awareness and those that 
are forever hidden from consciousness.' 
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2. For a discussion of the distinction between rules 'fit-
ting, overtly guiding, and implicitly guiding speakers' 
behaviour', cf. Quine 1972, pp. 440-6. 
3. The questions are (a) whether or to what extent an 
account along such lines can cover further aspects of 
meaning, and (b) exactly which features of knowledge of 
meaning the notion of rule-guidance can be supposed to 
explain. 
4. The requirement that propositional knowledge be ma-
nif es table is a regulative principle of the anti-realist ac-
count of meaning given by Michael Dummett (1976, 1978). 
This requirement is connected to a further principle con-
cerning sentences with recognition-transcendent truth-
conditions (e.g. counterfactual conditionals, sentences with 
undecidable predicates, quantified sentences whose quanti-
fiers range over infinite or unsurveyable domains, sen-
tences in the past tense): if such sentences are understood 
at all, they are not understood in any way analogous with 
our relatively uncontroversial way of understanding ob-
servation sentences. Our understanding of the former type 
of sentences does not consist in our apprehending what it 
would be like for them to be barely true under conditions 
in principle inaccessible to our recognitional capacities, 
conditions to which the manifestation requirement cannot 
be applied (cf. Dummett 1976, pp. 89ff.). For it is an 
unintelligible claim to say that we could grasp a truth-
condition whose obtaining we are in principle unable to 
recognise. According to Dummett, our understanding of 
such sentences does not consist in grasping their truth-
conditions, but in our knowledge of the conditions which 
would warrant their assertion. Assertibility-conditions (of 
which verifiability-conditions are a special case) do not 
obtain undetectably. It is, however, not possible to give a 
uniform statement of these conditions, and consequently 
the notion of warranted assertibility lacks many of the 
advantages of the classical notion of truth. For a discus-
sion of the requirement of manifestability, cf. Prawitz 
1977; Wright 1980; Edgington 1984. 
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5. The attitude of holding a sentence true plays a central 
role in the activity of radical interpretation (see note 7) 
as this is envisaged by Davidson: 'A good place to begin 
is with the attitude of holding a sentence true, of accept-
ing it as true. This is, of course, a belief, but it is a 
single attitude applicable to all sentences, and so does not 
ask us to be able to make finely discriminated distinctions 
among beliefs. It is an attitude an interpreter may plaus-
ibly be taken to be able to identify before he can inter-
pret, since he may know that a person intends to express 
a truth in uttering a sentence without having any idea 
what truth.' (Davidson 1984, p. 135.) 
6. Davidson I 984, p. 200. 
7. Davidson discusses radical interpretation mainly with 
reference to a situation where one person tries to under-
stand the utterances of a speaker of a foreign language 
by means of a theory fulfilling certain formal and empir-
ical conditions. However, the problems involved in radical 
interpretation are also present in the case of trying to 
understand a speaker of one's own language, only less 
obviously so. According to Davidson, 'All understanding 
of the speech of another involves radical interpretation' 
(1984, p. 125). The term 'radical interpretation' itself is 
of course 'meant to suggest strong kinship with Quine's 
.. radical translation". Kinship is not identity, however, 
and "interpretation" in place of "translation" marks one 
of the differences: a greater emphasis on the explicitly 
semantical in the former' (ibid., p. 126n.). For a general 
appraisal of the aims and claims of Davidson's programme 
of radical interpretation, cf. Lepore 1982. 
8. Davidson 1984, p. 142. 
9. Davidson 1984, p. 170. 
10. Quine's indeterminacy thesis is a thesis about the in-
determinacy of translation. In the following passage it is 
stated in very general terms: • ... rival systems of ana-
lytical hypotheses can fit the totality of speech behaviour 
to perfection, and can fit the totality of dispositions to 
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speech behaviour as well. and still specify mutually incom-
patible translations of countless sentences insusceptible of 
independent control' (1960, p. 72). Davidson repeatedly 
affirms that he accepts the indeterminacy thesis; but at 
the same time he points out that his approach will narrow 
the range of indeterminacy as compared with what Quine 
considers possible. Davidson's reasons for believing this 
are ( 1) that his theory reads more quantificational struc-
ture into the language that is to be interpreted, and (2) 
that he (Davidson) applies the principle of charity (ac-
cording to which 'assertions startlingly false on the face 
of them are likely to turn on hidden differences of lan-
guage', Quine 1960, p. 59) in a more general way than 
Quine. 
11. Cf. Davidson 1984, p. 130: 'A theory of interpretation 
for an object language may then be viewed as the result 
of the merger of a structurally revealing theory of inter-
pretation for a known language, and a system of translation 
from the unknown language into the known. The merger 
makes all reference to the known language otiose ... We 
have such theories, I suggest, in theories of truth of the 
kind Tarski first showed how to give (cf. Tarski, "The 
Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages"). What char-
acterizes a theory of truth in Tarski's style is that it 
entails, for every sentence s of the object language, a 
sentence of the form: 
s is true (in the object language) if and only if p. 
Instances of the form (which we shall call T-sentences) 
are obtained by replacing "s" by a canonical description 
of s, and "p" by a translation of s.' 
12. Cf. Davidson, 1984, p, 139. 
13. Dummett 1976; Wright 1976. 
14. Cf. Dummett 1973 and 1973a; Prawitz 1977, 1978. 
15. Quine 1960, pp. 9ff. 
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16. Ramsey 1978, p. 134. Cf. Davidson 1984, p. 279. 
17. In the austere account offered by Davidson the 'skillS' 
alluded to are those of the radical interpreter a~d no_t 
those of the foreign people whose language he ts try mg 
to understand. 
18. Putnam 1975, pp. 228f. The hypothesis of the division 
of linguistic labour is meant to explain the fact that 
every language 'possesses at least some terms whose asso-
ciated "criteria., are known only to a subset of the 
speakers who acquire the terms, and whose use by the other 
speakers depends upon a structured cooperati?n. b_etween 
them and the speakers in the relevant subsets (1b1?·• P-
228). Consequently an 'average' speaker who acquires a 
term subject to the division of labour does n_ot thereby 
acquire anything that fixes the term's extension (p. 229). 
19. Trans. Geach and Black 1960, p. 181. 
20. Trans. Austin 1953. p. 101. 
21. Cf. Wittgenstein 1969, p. 4. 
22. Vol. II, sections 138-55. 
23. Frege 1984, p. 263. Cf. 1903, sections 1~0, 15~, and 
the following passage: 'The gulf between arithm~tical 
formulas and their applications would not be bridged. In 
order to bridge it it is necessary that formulas express a 
sense and that th~ rules be grounded in the reference of 
the signs. The end must be knowledge and it must deter-
mine everything that happens' (sec. 92, trans. Geach and 
Black, p. 188). 
24. Cf. Orundgesetze, vol. I, sec. 31. 
25. Cf. Sundholm 1986. 
26. Kleene 1967, p. 161. 
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27. Investigations, p. 147 (b). To me Wittgenstein's re-
marks on the meaning of logical constants, and especially 
of negation, are singularly unenlightening. Of course, it is 
a matter of stipulation which type of negation we admit 
in a logical system: but these different types of 'negation' 
have different justifications; for instance, they hang 
together with different conceptions of falsity, for which 
linguistic usage gives us but little guidance. Moreover, we 
can gain insight by making a comparison between the dif-
ferent expressive powers of languages with different types 
of negation. But here we are dealing with a difficult prob-
lem and should not simply say that we can choose between 
different stipulations. If such stipulations are to have any 
point at all, they must be answerable to some informal 
notion whose strength and consequences we may want to 
investigate. 
28. Cf. Kreisel 1978. 
29. Cf. Baker and Hacker 1984. 
30. Wittgenstein 1969, pp. 12f. 
31. Ibid., p. 14. 
32. I should not have dwelt on this point, had not the 
way from scepticism about rules to meaning-scepticism 
been so persuasively paved by Kripke (1981). What Witt-
genstein really thought about the issue of rule-following 
is clearly expressed in section 81 of the Investigations: 'in 
philosophy we often compare the use of words with games 
and calculi which have fixed rules, but cannot say that 
someone who is using language must be playing such a 
game ... All this, however, can only appear in the right 
light when one has attained greater clarity about the con-
cepts of understanding, meaning, and thinking, for it will 
then also become clear what can mislead us (and did mis-
lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and 
means or understands it he is operating a calculus accord-
ing to definite rules.' (Translation corrected.) For a crit-
ical discussion of Kripke's interpretation see Goldfarb 
1984. 
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33. Cf. Investigations, I, 218. 
34. Wittgenstein 1980, sec. 944. Cf. the para1lel passages 
in Investigations, I, 228-235, where understanding some-
thing is compared to perceiving a physiognomy. It is a pity 
that the translator has failed to bring out the simile intended 
by Wittgenstein when he uses 'Gesicht'. 'Zug', 'Physiog-
nomie', a type of simile reminiscent of certain elements of 
Goethe's morphological thought (cf. Schulte 1984). 
35. Cf. Wittgenstein 1953, I, 555. 
36. Cf. Frege 1903, sec. 155; Wittgenstein 1953, I, 553; 
Kleene 1967, sec. 30; Binmore 1980, ch. 10. 
37. Wittgenstein 1974, I, sections 143-150. 
38. Cf. Picardi 1981, pp. 234-41. 
39. Cf. Baker and Hacker on Merkmal definitions, 1980, 
pp. 381ff. et passim. 
40. For comments and criticisms I wish to thank Amedeo 
G. Conte, Ernest Lepore, Gabriele Lolli, Enrico Moriconi, 
Ernesto Napoli and Barry Smith. 
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